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Abstract—An open distributed system can be secured by
requiring participants to present proof of work and rewarding
them for participation. The Bitcoin digital currency introduced
this mechanism, which is adopted by almost all contemporary
digital currencies and related services.
A natural process leads participants of such systems to form
pools, where members aggregate their power and share the
rewards. Experience with Bitcoin shows that the largest pools
are often open, allowing anyone to join. It has long been known
that a member can sabotage an open pool by seemingly joining it
but never sharing its proofs of work. The pool shares its revenue
with the attacker, and so each of its participants earns less.
We define and analyze a game where pools use some of
their participants to infiltrate other pools and perform such
an attack. With any number of pools, no-pool-attacks is not a
Nash equilibrium. With two pools, or any number of identical
pools, there exists an equilibrium that constitutes a tragedy of
the commons where the pools attack one another and all earn
less than they would have if none had attacked.
For two pools, the decision whether or not to attack is the
miner’s dilemma, an instance of the iterative prisoner’s dilemma.
The game is played daily by the active Bitcoin pools, which
apparently choose not to attack. If this balance breaks, the
revenue of open pools might diminish, making them unattractive
to participants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [18] is a digital currency that is gaining accep-
tance [24] and recognition [7], with an estimated market
capitalization of over 4.5 billion US dollars, as of Novem-
ber 2014 [6]. Bitcoin’s security stems from a robust incentive
system. Participants are required to provide expensive proofs
of work, and they are rewarded according to their efforts.
This architecture has proved both stable and scalable, and it
is used by most contemporary digital currencies and related
services, e.g. [16], [10], [17], [19]. Our results apply to all
such incentive systems, but we use Bitcoin terminology and
examples since it serves as an active and prominent prototype.
Bitcoin implements its incentive systems with a data struc-
ture called the blockchain. The blockchain is a serialization
of all money transactions in the system. It is a single global
ledger maintained by an open distributed system. Since anyone
can join the open system and participate in maintaining the
blockchain, Bitcoin uses a proof of work mechanism to deter
attacks: participation requires exerting significant compute
resources. A participant that proves she has exerted enough
resources with a proof of work is allowed to take a step in the
protocol by generating a block. Participants are compensated
for their efforts with newly minted Bitcoins. The process of
creating a block is called mining, and the participants —
miners.
In order to win the reward, many miners try to generate
blocks. The system automatically adjusts the difficulty of block
generation, such that one block is added every 10 minutes to
the blockchain. This means that each miner seldom generates
a block. Although its revenue may be positive in expectation,
a miner may have to wait for an extended period to create
a block and earn the actual Bitcoins. Therefore, miners form
mining pools, where all members mine concurrently and they
share their revenue whenever one of them creates a block.
Pools are typically implemented as a pool manager and a
cohort of miners. The pool manager joins the Bitcoin system
as a single miner. Instead of generating proof of work, it
outsources the work to the miners. In order to evaluate the
miners’ efforts, the pool manager accepts partial proof of work
and estimates each miner’s power according to the rate with
which it submits such partial proof of work. When a miner
generates a full proof of work, it sends it to the pool manager
which publishes this proof of work to the Bitcoin system. The
pool manager thus receives the full revenue of the block and
distributes it fairly according to its members power. Many of
the pools are open — they allow any miner to join them using
a public Internet interface.
Such open pools are susceptible to the classical block
withholding attack [22], where a miner sends only partial proof
of work to the pool manager and discards full proof of work.
Due to the partial proof of work it sends to the pool, the miner
is considered a regular pool member and the pool can estimate
its power. Therefore, the attacker shares the revenue obtained
by the other pool members, but does not contribute. It reduces
the revenue of the other members, but also its own. We provide
necessary background on the Bitcoin protocol, pools and the
classical block withholding attack in Section II, and specify
our model in Section III.
In this work we analyze block withholding attacks among
pools. A pool that employs the pool block withholding attack
registers with the victim pool as a regular miner. It receives
tasks from the victim pool and transfers them to some of its
own miners. We call these infiltrating miners, and the mining
power spent by a pool the infiltration rate. When the attacking
pool’s infiltrating miners deliver partial proofs of work, the
attacker transfers them to the victim pool, letting the attacked
pool estimate their power. When the infiltrating miners deliver
a full proof of work, the attacking pool discards it.
This attack affects the revenues of the pools in several ways.
The victim pool’s effective mining rate is unchanged, but its
total revenue is divided among more miners. The attacker’s
mining power is reduced, since some of its miners are used
for block withholding, but it earns additional revenue through
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its infiltration of the other pool. And finally, the total effective
mining power in the system is reduced, causing the Bitcoin
protocol to reduce the difficulty.
Taking all these factors into account, we observe that a pool
might be able to increase its revenue by attacking other pools.
Each pool therefore makes a choice of whether to attack each
of the other pools in the system, and with what infiltration
rate. This gives rise to the pool game. We specify this game
and provide initial analysis in Section IV.
In Section V we analyze the scenario of exactly two pools
where only one can attack the other. Here, the attacker can
always increase its revenue by attacking. We conclude that in
the general case, with any number of pools, no-pool-attacks is
not a Nash equilibrium.
Next, Section VI deals with the case of two pools, where
each can attack the other. Here analysis becomes more compli-
cated in two ways. First, the revenue of each pool affects the
revenue of the other through the infiltrating miners. We prove
that for a static choice of infiltration rates the pool revenues
converge. Second, once one pool changes its infiltration rate of
the other, the latter may prefer to change its infiltration rate of
the former. Therefore the game itself takes steps to converge.
We show analytically that the game has a single Nash Equilib-
rium and numerically study the equilibrium points for different
pool sizes. For pools smaller than 50%, at the equilibrium
point both pools earn less than they would have in the non-
equilibrium no-one-attacks strategy.
Since pools can decide to start or stop attacking at any point,
this can be modeled as the miner’s dilemma — an instance
of the iterative prisoner’s dilemma. Attacking is the dominant
strategy in each iteration, but if the pools can agree not to
attack, both benefit in the long run.
Finally we address the case of an arbitrary number of
identical pools in Section VII. There exists a symmetric
equilibrium point in which each pool attacks each other pool.
As in the minority two-pools scenario, here too at equilibrium
all pools earn less than with the no-pool-attacks strategy.
Our results imply that block withholding by pools leads
to an unfavorable equilibrium. Nevertheless, due to the
anonymity of miners, a single pool might be tempted to attack,
leading the other pools to attack as well. The implications
might be devastating for open pools: If their revenues are
reduced, miners will prefer to form closed pools that cannot
be attacked in this manner. Though this may be conceived
as bad news for public mining pools, on the whole it may
be good news to the Bitcoin system, which prefers small
pools. We discuss this and other issues pertaining to practice
in Section VIII.
In summary, our contributions are the following:
1) Definition of the pool game where pools in a proof-of-
work secured system attack one another with a pool block
withholding attack.
2) In the general case, no-pool-attacks is not an equilibrium.
3) With two minority pools, the only Nash Equilibrium is
when the pools attack one another, and both earn less
than if none had attacked.
Miners therefore face the miner’s dilemma, an instance
of the iterative prisoner’s dilemma, repeatedly choosing
between attack and no-attack.
4) With multiple pools of equal size there is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, where all pools earn less than if none
had attacked.
5) For Bitcoin, inefficient equilibria for open pools may
serve the system by reducing their attraction and pushing
miners towards smaller closed pools.
The classical block withholding attack is old as pools
themselves, but its use by pools has not been suggested
until recently. We overview related attacks and prior work in
Section IX, and end with concluding remarks in Section X.
II. PRELIMINARIES — BITCOIN AND POOLED MINING
Bitcoin is a distributed, decentralized digital currency [5],
[4], [18], [3]. Clients use the system by issuing transactions,
and the system’s only task is to serialize transactions in a single
ledger and reject transactions that cannot be serialized due to
conflicts with previous transactions. Bitcoin transactions are
protected with cryptographic techniques that ensure that only
the rightful owner of a Bitcoin can transfer it.
The transaction ledger is stored in a data structure caller
the blockchain. The blockchain is maintained by a network
of miners, which are compensated for their effort in Bitcoins.
The miners are in charge of recording the transactions in the
blockchain.
A. Revenue for Proof Of Work
The blockchain records the transactions in units of blocks.
Each block includes a unique ID, and the ID of the preceding
block. The first block, dubbed the genesis block, is defined
as part of the protocol. A valid block contains the hash of
the previous block, the hash of the transactions in the current
block, and a Bitcoin address which is to be credited with a
reward for generating the block.
Any miner may add a valid block to the chain by (prob-
abilistically) proving that it has spent a certain amount of
work and publishing the block with the proof over an overlay
network to all other miners. When a miner creates a block,
it is compensated for its efforts with Bitcoins. This compen-
sation includes a per-transaction fee paid by the users whose
transactions are included, and an amount of minted Bitcoins
that are thus introduced into the system. The rate at which
the new Bitcoins are generated with each block is designed
to slowly decrease towards zero, and will reach zero when 21
million Bitcoins are created. Then, the miners’ revenue will
be only from transaction fees.
The work which a miner is required to do is to repeatedly
calculate a a hash function — specifically the SHA-256 of the
SHA-256 of a block header. To indicate that he has performed
this work, the miner provides a probabilistic proof as follows.
The generated block has a nonce field, which can contain
any value. The miner places different values in this field and
calculates the hash for each value. If the result of the hash is
smaller than a target value, the nonce is considered a solution,
and the block is valid.
The number of attempts to find a single hash is therefore
random with a geometric distribution, as each attempt is a
Bernoulli trial with a success probability determined by the
target value. At the existing huge hashing rates and target
values, the time to find a single hash can be approximated
by an exponential distribution. The average time for a miner
to find a solution is therefore proportional to its hashing rate
or mining power.
To maintain a constant rate of Bitcoin generation, and as
part of its defense against denial of service and other attacks,
the system normalizes the rate of block generation. To achieve
this, the protocol deterministically defines the target value for
each block according to the time required to generate recent
blocks. The target, or difficulty, is updated once every 2016
blocks such that the average time for each block to be found
is 10 minutes.
Note that the exponential distribution is memoryless. If all
miners mine for block number b, once the block is found at
time t, all miners switch to mine for the subsequent block b+1
at t without changing their probability distribution of finding
a block after t. Therefore, the probability that a miner i with
mining power mi finds the next block is its ratio out of the
total mining power m in the system.
Forks
Block propagation in the overlay network takes seconds,
whereas the average mining interval is 10 minutes. It is there-
fore possible for two miners to generate competing blocks,
both of which list the same block as their predecessor. The
system has mechanism to solve such situations, causing one
of the blocks to be discarded. However, such bifurcations are
rare and occur on average once every 60 blocks [9], and we
ignore them for the sake of simplicity. Since the choice of the
discarded block on bifurcation is random, one may incorporate
this event into the probability of finding a block, and consider
instead the probability of finding a block that is not discarded.
B. Pools
As the value of Bitcoin rose, Bitcoin mining has become
a rapidly advancing industry. Technological advancements
lead to ever more efficient hashing ASICs [26], and mining
datacenters are built around the world [21]. Mining is only
profitable using dedicated cutting edge mining rigs, otherwise
the energy costs exceed the expected revenue.
Although expected revenue from mining is proportional
to the power of the mining rigs used, a single home miner
using a small rig is unlikely to mine a block for years [25].
Consequently, miners often organize themselves into mining
pools. Logically, a pool is a group of miners that share their
revenues when one of them successfully mines a block. For
each block found, the revenue is distributed among the pool
members in proportion to their mining power1. The expected
1This is a simplification that is sufficient for our analysis. The intricacies
of reward systems are explained in [22].
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Fig. 1. A system with 8 miners and 3 honest pools. Pool 1 has 3 registered
miners, pools 2 and 3 have 2 registered miners each, and one miner mines
solo.
revenue of a pool member is therefore the same as its revenue
had it mined solo. However, due to the large power of the pool,
it finds blocks at a much higher rate, and so the frequency of
revenue collection is higher, allowing for a stable daily or
weekly income.
In practice, most pools are controlled by a pool manager.2
Miners register with the pool manager and mine on its behalf:
The pool manager generates tasks and the miners search for
solutions based on these tasks that can serve as proof of work.
Once they find a solution, they send it to the pool manager. The
pool manager behaves as a single miner in the Bitcoin system.
Once it obtains a legitimate block from one of its miners, it
publishes it. The block transfers the revenue to the control
of the pool manager. The pool manager then distributes the
revenue among the miners according to their mining power.
The architecture is illustrated in Figure 1
In order to estimate the mining power of a miner, the pool
manager sets a partial target for each member, much larger
(i.e., easier) than the target of the Bitcoin system. Each miner
is required to send the pool manager blocks that are correct
according to the partial target. The partial target is chosen to
be large, such that partial solutions arrive frequently enough
for the manager to accurately estimate the power of the miner,
but small (hard) to reduce management overhead. Pools often
charge a small percentage of the revenue as fee. We discuss
in Section VIII the implications of such fees to our analysis.
Many pools are open and accept any interested miner. Pool
interface typically includes a web interface for registration and
a miner interface for the mining software. In order to mine
for a pool, a miner registers with the web interface, supplies a
Bitcoin address to receive its future shares of the revenue, and
receives from the pool credentials for mining. Then he feeds
his credentials and the pool’s address to its mining rig, which
starts mining. The mining rig obtains its tasks from the pool
and sends partial and full proof of work with the STRATUM
protocol [28]. As it finds blocks, the pool manager credits
the miner’s account according to its share of the work, and
transfers these funds either on request or automatically to the
aforementioned Bitcoin address.
2A notable exception is P2Pool [13], which we discuss in Section VIII.
Miners
Pool 1
Bitcoin Network
Miners MinersMiners
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Fig. 2. Classical Block Withholding attack. A group of miners attack Pool 2
with a block withholding attack, denoted by a dashed red arrow.
Too Big Pools
Arguably in realistic scenarios of the Bitcoin system no
pool controls a majority of the mining power. The reason is
that the manager of a pool of this size can single-handedly
take control of the Bitcoin system by generating the longest
chain and ignoring blocks generated by other miners.
If the system reaches this situation it is severely unsta-
ble [1] (and [11] warns that the system is unstable with even
smaller pools). For one day in June 2014 a single pool called
GHash.IO produced over 50% of the blocks in the Bitcoin
main chain. The Bitcoin community backlashed at the pool
(which did nothing worse than being extremely successful).
GHash.IO reduced its relative mining power and publicly
committed to stay away from the 50% limit.
C. Block Withholding
Classical Block Withholding [22] is an attack performed by
a pool member against the other pool members. The attacking
miner registers with the pool and apparently starts mining
honestly — it regularly sends the pool partial proof of work.
However, the attacking miner sends only partial proof of work.
If it finds a full solution that constitutes a full proof of work it
discards the solution, reducing the pool’s total revenue. This
attack is illustrated in Figure 2.
The attacker does not change the pool’s effective mining
power, and does not affect directly the revenue of other pools.
However, the attacked pool shares its revenue with the attacker.
Therefore each miner earns less, as the same revenue is
distributed among more miners.
Recall that the proof of work is only valid to a specific
block, as it is the nonce with which the block’s hash is smaller
than the target. The attacking miner cannot use it. Moreover,
this attack reduces the attacker’s revenue compared to solo
mining or honest pool participation: It suffers from the reduced
revenue like the other pool participants, and its revenue is less
than its share of the total mining power in the system. This
attack can therefore only be used for sabotage, at a cost to the
attacker.
Detection: Although a pool can detect that it is under a
block withholding attack with good accuracy, it might not
be able to detect which of its registered miners are the
perpetrators. The reason is that, by design, the partial proof
of work difficulty is much easier than the full proof of work
difficulty. A pool can estimate its expected mining power and
its actual mining power by the rates of partial proofs of work
and full proofs of work, respectively, supplied by its miners. A
difference above a set confidence interval indicates an attack.
To detect whether a single miner is attacking it, the pool
must use a similar technique, comparing the estimated mining
power of the attacker based on its partial proof of work with
the fact it never supplies a full proof of work. If the attacker
has a small mining power, it will send frequent partial proofs
of work, but the pool will only expect to see a full proof
of work at very low frequency. Therefore, it cannot obtain
statistically significant results that would indicate an attack.
An attacker can therefore use multiple small miners, rather
than a single large one, and replace them frequently. For ex-
ample, miners whose expected full proof of work frequency is
yearly will see a non-negligible daily revenue (B25/12/31 ≈
B0.07). Replacing them monthly will not allow a pool to
confidently tag them as attackers without tagging legitimate
miners as well.
III. MODEL AND STANDARD OPERATION
Bitcoin is the first widely used system that rewards partic-
ipants for proof of work at a dynamically normalized rate.
Its success demonstrates the strength of this architecture, and
others were quick to follow. Most are digital currencies with
a various proof of work algorithms; some have other uses, for
example NameCoin [19], which is a DNS replacement with
no central authority. This model, and therefore our results,
apply to all such systems. Nevertheless, since Bitcoin is both
a prototype and a working example, we use the Bitcoin
terminology.
We specify the basic model in which participants operate in
Section III-A, proceed to describe how honest miners operate
in this environment in Sections III-B and III-C, and how the
classical block withholding attack is implemented with our
model in Section III-D.
A. Model
The system is comprised of the Bitcoin network and nodes,
and progresses in steps. Each node has a unique ID id and
can generate tasks by calling the newTask(id) command. The
task is associated with the given id.
A node can work on a task for the duration of a step using
the work(task) command. A node that works on tasks with
work() is called a miner. The command returns a set of partial
proof of work and a set of full proofs of work. The number
of proofs in each set has a Poisson distribution, partial proofs
with a large mean and full proofs with a small mean. All
nodes have identical power, and hence identical probabilities
to generate proofs of work.
Algorithm 1: Solo Miner w
1 function doStep
2 task← newTask(w)
3 (pPoW, fPoW)← work(task)
4 publish(task, fPoW)
The Bitcoin network pays for full proofs of work. To
acquire this payoff an entity publishes a task task and its
corresponding proof of work PoW to the network by calling
the publish(task,PoW) command, which returns the amount
earned. The payoff goes to the ID associated with task. The
Bitcoin protocol normalizes revenue such that the average total
revenue distributed in each step is a constant throughout the
execution of the system. A node can transact b Bitcoins to
another node with ID w with the pay(w, b) command.
Apart from the work() command, all local operations,
payments, message sending, propagation, and receipt are in-
stantaneous.
We assume that the number of miners is large enough such
that mining power can be split arbitrarily without resolution
constraints. Denote the number of pools with p, the total
number of mining power in the system with m and the miners
loyal to pool i (1 ≤ i ≤ p) with mi. We use a quasi-static
analysis where miner loyalty to a pool does not change over
time.
B. Solo Mining
Nodes are defined by an implementation of a doStep func-
tion — their routine in a single step. As a first example we
provide the behavior of a solo miner. A solo miner is a node
that generates its own tasks and publishes them to earn the
payoff. The algorithm of a solo miner is given in Algorithm 1.
C. Pools
Pools are nodes that serve as coordinators and multiple
miners can register to a pool and work for it. The pseudocode
for a miner w working for a pool i is shown in Algorithm 2.
The pool generates the tasks and sends a task to each miner.
The miner receives its task and works on it for the duration
of the step. Since full proofs of work are rarely found, the
pool needs to reliably measure the miner’s work in a different
manner. To facilitate pool operation, miners send the pool not
only full proof of work, but also partial proofs of work.
The pool receives the proofs of work of all its miners,
registers the partial proofs of work and publishes the full
proofs. It calculates its overall revenue, and proceeds to
distribute it among its miners. Each miner receives revenue
proportional to its success in the current step, namely the ratio
of its partial proofs of work out of all partial proofs of work
the pool received. The pool pays miner w its share b of the
revenue with pay(w, b), and notifies the miner of the payment
with a separate message. We assume that pools do not collect
fees of the revenue. Pool fees and their implications on our
analysis are discussed in Section VIII.
Algorithm 2: Honest miner w at Pool i.
Miner w
1 state
2 revenue ∈ R, initially 0
3 function doStep
4 task← recv(i)
5 (pPoW, fPoW)← work(task)
6 send(i, (pPoW, fPoW))
7 revenue← revenue + recv(i)
Pool i
8 state
9 W ⊂ ID space
10 tasks(·) : W → Task space
11 function doStep
12 stepRevenue← 0
13 foreach Registered Miner w do
14 tasks(w)← newTask(i)
15 send(w, tasks(w))
(Wait until end of step.)
16 foreach w ∈W do
17 (pPoW, fPoW)← recv(w)
18 stepRevenue←
stepRevenue + publish(tasks(w), fPoW)
19 pPoWs(w)← pPoW
20 stepPPow←∑registered w pPoWs(w)
21 foreach w ∈W do
22 pay(w, stepRevenue× pPoWs(w)/stepPPow)
23 send(w, stepRevenue× pPoWs(w)/stepPPow)
Algorithm 3: Block Withholding Miner w at pool i.
1 function doStep
2 task← taskFromPool(i, w)
3 (pPoW, fPoW)← work(task)
4 PoWToPool(i, pPoW, ∅)
5 collect(i, w)
D. Block Withholding Miner
A miner registered at a pool can perform the classical block
withholding attack, where it operates as if it worked for the
pool, only it never sends its proof of work. The pseudocode
is in Algorithm 3, for a miner interacting with a standard
pool as in Algorithm 2. The pool registers the miner’s partial
proofs, but cannot distinguish between miners running the
honest miner of Algorithm 2 and block withholding miners
running Algorithm 3.
The implications are that a miner that engages in block
withholding does not contribute to the pool’s overall mining
power, but still shares the pool’s revenue according to its sent
partial proofs of work.
To reason about a pool’s efficiency we define its per-miner
revenue as follows.
Definition 1 (Revenue density). The revenue density of a pool
is the ratio between the average revenue a pool member earns
and the average revenue it would have earned as a solo miner.
The revenue density of a solo miner, and that of a miner
working with an unattacked pool are 1. If a pool is attacked
with block withholding, its revenue density decreases.
E. Continuous Analysis
Because our analysis will be of the average revenue, we will
consider proofs of work, both full and partial, as continuous
deterministic sizes, according to their probability. The work()
command will therefore return a deterministic fraction of proof
of work.
IV. THE POOL GAME
A. The Pool Block Withholding Attack
Just as a miner can perform block withholding on a pool
j, a pool i can use some of its miners to infiltrate a pool
j and perform a block withholding attack on j. Denote the
number of such infiltrating miners at step t by xi,j(t). In
this case, the infiltrating miners obtain their share of pool j’s
revenue, and transfer it back to pool i. Infiltrators from i to j,
as well as any miners that honestly mine for pool i, are loyal to
pool i. Pool i distributes its revenue from mining and from its
infiltrators evenly among all its registered miners, according
to their partial proofs of work.
The pseudocode of a block withholding pool is shown in
Algorithm 4. The pool’s miners are oblivious to the change
and their algorithm is identical to the one in Algorithm 2.
B. Block Withholding Recycling
We assume that the infiltrating miners are loyal to the at-
tacker. However, some of the pool’s members may be disloyal
infiltrators. For example, pool 1 can use a loyal miner to
infiltrate pool 2, and pool 2, thinking the miner is loyal to
it, might use it to attack pool 1.
When sending disloyal miners to perform block withholding
at other pools, an attacker takes a significant risk. The pool 2’s
perspective in the scenario described above. The disloyal miner
can perform honest mining for pool 1, rather than withhold its
blocks, and not return any revenue to pool 2. Moreover, it will
take its share of pool 2’s revenues (which thinks the miner is
loyal to it) and deliver it back to pool 1.
To avoid such a risk, a pool needs a sufficient number of
verified miners — miners that it knows to be loyal. In Bitcoin
this happens in the common case where the pool owner has
miners of his own.
C. Revenue Convergence
Note that pool j sends its revenue to infiltrators from
pool i at the end of the step, and this revenue is calculated
in pool i at the beginning of the subsequent step with the
prevRoundInfiltrationRevenue variable. If there is a chain of
pools of length ` where each pool infiltrates the next, the pool
revenue will not be constant, since the revenue from infiltration
takes one step to take each hop. If `max is the longest chain in
the system, the revenue stabilizes after `max steps and remains
constant. If there are loops in the infiltration graph, the system
will converge to a certain revenue.
Lemma 1 (Revenue convergence). If infiltration rates are
constant, the pool revenues converge.
Proof. Denote the revenue density of pool i at the end of step t
by ri(t), and define the revenue density vector
r(t) ∆= (r1(t), . . . , rp(t))T .
In every round, pool i uses its mining power of m1−
∑
j x1,j
used for direct mining (and not attacking), and shares it among
its m1 +
∑
j xj,1 members (all sums are over the range
1, . . . , p), including malicious infiltrators. Denote the direct
mining revenue density of each pool (ignoring normalization,
which is a constant factor) with the vector
m ∆=
(
m1 −
∑
j x1,j
m1 +
∑
j xj,1
, . . . ,
mp − xp,j
mp +
∑
j xj,p
)T
.
The revenue of Pool i in step t taken through infiltration
from pool j’s revenue in step t − 1 is xi,jrj(t − 1). Pool i
distributes this revenue among its mi +
∑
k xk,i members —
loyal and infiltrators. Define the p×p infiltration matrix whose
i, j element is
G ∆=
[
xi,j
mi +
∑
k xk,i
]
ij
.
And the revenue vector at step t is
r(t) = m + Gr(t− 1) . (1)
Since the row sums of the infiltration matrix are smaller
than one, its largest eigenvalue is smaller than 1 according to
the Perron-Frobenius theorem. Therefore, the revenues at all
pools converges as follows for t ≥ 1:
r(t) =
(
t−1∑
t′=0
Gt
)
m + Gtr(0) t→∞−−−→ (1−G)−1m . (2)
D. The Pool Game
In the pool game pools try to optimize their infiltration rates
of other pools to maximize their revenue. The overall number
of miners and the number of miners loyal to each pool remain
constant throughout the game.
Time progresses in rounds. Let s be a constant integer large
enough that revenue can be approximated as its convergence
limit. In each round the system takes s steps and then a
single pool, picked with a round-robin policy, may change
its infiltration rates of all other pools. The total revenue of
each step is normalized to 1/s, so the revenue per round is
one.
Algorithm 4: Block Withholding Pool i.
1 state
2 prevRoundInfiltrationRevenue ∈ R, initially 0
3 W ⊂ ID space
4 inf(·) : W → ID space ∪ ⊥
5 tasks(·) : W → Task space
6 function doStep
7 foreach w ∈W do
8 if inf(w) 6= ⊥ then (infiltrator)
9 tasks(w)← taskFromPool(inf(w), i)
10 else
11 tasks(w)← newTask(i)
12 sendTask(w, tasks(w))
(Wait until end of round)
13 stepRevenue← prevRoundInfiltrationRevenue
14 stepPPow← 0
15 foreach w ∈W do
16 (pPoW, fPoW)← getPoW(w)
17 stepPPow← stepPPow + |pPoW|
18 if inf(w) 6= ⊥ then (infiltrator)
19 PoWToPool(inf(w), pPoW, ∅)
20 else
21 stepRevenue← stepRevenue + publish(tasks(w), fPoW)
22 foreach w ∈W do
23 pay(w, stepRevenue · pPoWs(w)/stepPPow)
24 prevRoundInfiltrationRevenue← 0
25 foreach {w|w ∈W ∧ inf(w) 6= ⊥} do
26 prevRoundInfiltrationRevenue← prevRoundInfiltrationRevenue + collect(inf(w), i)
Pool Knowledge: The pool taking a step knows the rate
of infiltrators attacking it (though not their identity) and the
revenue rates of each of the other pools. This knowledge
is required to optimize a pool’s revenue, as we explain in
Section IV-E.
A pool can estimate the rate with which it is attacked
by comparing the rates of partial and full proofs of work it
receives from its miners, as explained in Section II-C. In order
to estimate the attack rates against each of the other pools, a
pool can use one of two methods. First, pools often publish this
data to demonstrate their honesty to their miners [23], [15],
[12]. Second, a pool can infiltrate each of the other pools with
some nominal probing mining power and measure the revenue
density directly by monitoring the probe’s rewards from the
pool.
E. General Analysis
Recall that mi is the number of miners loyal to pool i. and
xi,j(t) is the number of miners used by pool i to infiltrate
pool j at step t.
The mining rate of pool i is therefore the number of its loyal
miners minus the miners it uses for infiltration. This absolute
mining rate denoted is divided by the total mining rate in the
system, namely the number of all miners that do not engage
in block withholding. Denoted the direct mining rate at step t
by
Ri
∆
=
mi −
∑p
j=1 xi,j
m−∑pj=1∑pk=1 xj,k (3)
The revenue density of pool i at the end of step t is its
revenue from direct mining together with its revenue from
infiltrated pools, divided by the number of its loyal miners
together with block-withholding infiltrators that attack it:
ri(t) =
Ri(t) +
∑p
j=1 xi,j(t)rj(t)
mi +
∑p
j=1 xj,i(t)
. (4)
When pool i takes a step t, it knows the revenue density
of all other pools rj(t − 1) and its total infiltration rate∑p
j=1 xj,i(t).
No attack
If no pool engages in block withholding,
∀i, j : xi,j = 0 ,
we have at all times
∀i : ri(t) = 1/m ,
that is, each miner’s revenue is proportional to its power, be
it in a pool or working solo.
Miners
Pool 1 Pool 2
Bitcoin Network
Miners Miners
𝑥1,2
Fig. 3. The one-attacker scenario. Pool 1 attacks pool 2.
V. ONE ATTACKER
We begin our analysis with a simplified game of two
pools, 1 and 2, where pool 1 can infiltrate pool 2, but pool 2
cannot infiltrates pool 1. The m−m1−m2 miners outside both
pools mine solo (or with closed pools that do not attack and
cannot be attacked). This scenario is illustrated in Figure 3.
The dashed red arrow indicates that x1,2 of pool 1’s mining
power infiltrates pool 2 with a block withholding attack.
Since Pool 2 does not engage in block withholding, all of its
m2 loyal miners work on its behalf. Pool 1, on the other hand
does not employ x1,2 of its loyal miners, and its direct mining
power is only m1−x1,2. The Bitcoin system normalizes these
rates by the total number of miners that publish full proofs,
namely all miners but x1,2. The pools’ direct revenues are
therefore
R1 =
m1 − x1,2
m− x1,2
R2 =
m2
m− x1,2 .
(5)
Pool 2 divides its revenue among its loyal miners and the
miners that infiltrated it. Its revenue density is therefore
r2 =
R2
m2 + x1,2
. (6)
Pool 1 divides its revenue among its registered miners.
The revenue includes both its direct mining revenue and the
revenue its infiltrators obtained from pool 2, which is r2 ·x1,2.
The revenue per loyal Pool 1 miner is therefore
r1 =
R1 + x1,2 · r2
m1
. (7)
We obtain the expression for r1 in Equation 7 by substitut-
ing r2 from Equation 6 and R1 and R2 from equation 5:
r1 =
(x1,2)
2 −m1(m2 + x1,2)
m1(x1,2 − 1)(m2 + x1,2)
A. Game Progress
Pool 1 controls its infiltration rate of pool 2, namely x1,2,
and will choose the value that maximizes the revenue density
(per-miner revenue) r1 on the first round of the pool game.
The value of r1 is maximized at a single point in the feasible
range 0 ≤ x1,2 ≤ m1. Since pool 2 cannot not react to pool 1’s
attack, this point is the stable state of the system, and we
denote the value of x1,2 there by x¯1,2
∆
= arg maxx1,2 r1 , and
the values of the corresponding revenues of the pools with r¯1
and r¯2.
Substituting the stable value x1,2 we obtain the revenues of
the two pools; all are given in Figure 4.
B. Numerical Analysis
We analyze this game numerically by finding the x1,2 that
maximizes r1 and substituting this value for r1 and r2. We
vary the sizes of the pools through the entire possible range
and depict the optimal x1,2 and the corresponding revenues
in Figure 5. Each point in each graph therefore represents the
equilibrium point of a game with the corresponding m1 and
m2 sizes, where we normalize m = 1. The top right half of
the range in all graphs is not feasible, as the sum of m1 and
m2 is larger than 1. We use this range as a reference color, and
we use a dashed line to show the bound between this value
within the feasible range.
Figure 5a shows the optimal infiltration rate. In the entire
feasible range we see that pool 1 chooses a strictly positive
value for x1,2. Indeed, the revenue of pool 1 is depicted in
Figure 5b and in the entire feasible region it is strictly larger
than 1, which the pool would have gotten without attacking
(x1,2 = 0). Figure 5c depicts the revenue of Pool 2, which is
strictly smaller than 1 in the entire range.
Note that the total system mining power is reduced when
pool 1 chooses to infiltrate pool 2. Therefore, the revenue of
third parties, miners not in either pool, increases from 1/m
to 1/(m − x1,2). Pool 2 therefore pays for the increased
revenue of its attacker and everyone else in the system.
C. Implications to the general case
Consider the case of p pools. For any choice of the pools
sizes m1, . . . ,mp, at least one pool will choose to perform
block withholding:
Lemma 2. In a system with p pools, the point ∀j, k : xkj = 0
is not an equilibrium.
Proof. Assume towards negation this is not the case, and
∀j, k : xkj = 0 is an equilibrium point. Now consider a
setting with only pools 1 and 2, and treat the other pools
as independent miners. This is the setting analyzed above
and we have seen there that pool 1 can increase its revenue
by performing a block withholding attack on pool 2. Denote
pool 1’s infiltration rate by x˜21 > 0. Now, take this values back
to the setting at hand with p pools. The revenue of pool 1 is
better when
x21 = x˜
2
1,∀(j, k) 6= (1, 2) : xkj = 0 .
Therefore, pool 1 can improve its revenue by attacking pool 2,
and no-one-attacks is not an equilibrium point.
x¯1,2 =
m2 −m1m2 +
√
−m22(−1 + m1 + m1m2)
−1 + m1 + m2
r¯1 =
m1 + (2 + m1)m2 + 2
√
−m22(−1 + m1 + m1m2)
m1(1 + m2)2
r¯2 =
−m2(−1 + m1 + m2)2(
m22 +
√
−m22(−1 + m1 + m1m2)
)(
1−m1(1 + m2) +
√
−m22(−1 + m1 + m1m2)
)
(8)
Fig. 4. Stable state where only pool 1 attacks pool 2.
(a) x1,2 (b) r1 (c) r2
Fig. 5. Two pools where one infiltrates the other: Optimal infiltration rate x1,2 and corresponding revenues (r1 and r2) as a function of pool sizes. The line
in (a) shows x1,2 = 0 and the lines in (b) and (c) show the revenue density of 1.
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Fig. 7. Two pools attacking each other.
VI. TWO POOLS
We proceed to analyze the case where two pools may attack
each other and the other miners mine solo. Again we have
pool 1 of size m1 and pool 2 of size m2; pool 1 controls its
infiltration rate x1,2 of pool 2, but now pool 2 also controls
its infiltration rate x2,1 of pool 1. This scenario is illustrated
in Figure 7
The total mining power in the system is m − x1,2 − x2,1
The direct revenues R1 and R2 of the pools from mining are
their effective mining rates, without infiltrating mining power,
divided by the total mining rate.
R1 =
m1 − x1,2
m− x1,2 − x2,1
R2 =
m2 − x2,1
m− x1,2 − x2,1 .
(9)
The total revenue of each pool is its direct mining revenue,
above, and the infiltration revenue from the previous round,
which is the attacked pool’s total revenue multiplied by its
infiltration rate. The pool’s total revenue is divided among its
loyal miners and miners that infiltrated it. At stable state this
is
r1 =
R1 + x1,2r2
m1 + x2,1
r2 =
R2 + x2,1r1
m2 + x1,2
.
(10)
Solving for r1 and r2 we obtain the following closed
expressions for each. We express the revenues as functions
of x1,2 and x2,1.
r1(x1,2, x2,1) =
m2R1 + x1,2(R1 + R2)
m1m2 + m1x1,2 + m2x2,1
r2(x2,1, x1,2) =
m1R2 + x2,1(R1 + R2)
m1m2 + m1x1,2 + m2x2,1
.
(11)
Each pool controls only its own infiltration rate. In each
round of the pool game, each pool will optimize its infiltration
rate of the other. If pool 1 acts at step t, it optimizes its revenue
(a) x1,2 (b) x2,1
(c) r1 (d) r2
Fig. 6. Two attacking pools system: Optimal infiltration rates (x1 and x2) and corresponding revenues (r1 and r2) as a function of pool sizes. Lines in (a)
and (b) are at x1,2 = 0 and x2,1 = 0, respectively. Lines in (c) and (d) are at r1 = 1 and r2 = 1, respectively.
with
x1,2(t)← arg max
x′
r1(x
′, x2,1(t− 1)) , (12)
and if pool 2 acts at step t, it optimizes its revenue with
x2,1(t)← arg max
x′
r2(x
′, x1,2(t− 1)) . (13)
An equilibrium exists where neither pool 1 nor pool 2 can
improve its revenue by changing its infiltration rate. That is,
any pair of values x′1, x
′
2 such that{
arg maxx1,2 r1(x1,2, x
′
2,1) = x
′
1,2
arg maxx2,1 r2(x
′
1,2, x2,1) = x
′
2,1
(14)
under the constraints
0 < x1 < m1
0 < x2 < m2 .
(15)
The feasible region for the pool sizes is m1 > 0,m2 > 0,
and m1 + m2 ≤ m. The revenue function for ri is concave
in xi (∂2ri/∂x2i < 0) for all feasible values of the variables.
Therefore the solutions for equations 12 and 13 are unique
and are either at the borders of the feasible region or where
∂ri/∂xi,j = 0.
From Section V we know that no-attack is not an equilib-
rium point, since each pool can increase its revenue by choos-
ing a strictly positive infiltration rate, that is, x1,2 = x2,1 = 0
is not a solution to Equations 14–15.
Nash equilibrium therefore exists with x1,2, x2,1 values
where 
∂r1(x1,2, x2,1)
∂x1,2
= 0
∂r2(x2,1, x1,2)
∂x2,1
= 0
. (16)
Using symbolic computation tools, we see that there is a
single pair of values for which Equation 16 holds for a choice
of m1 and m2.
A. Numerical Analysis
A numerical analysis confirms these observations. We sim-
ulate the pool game for a range of pool sizes. For each choice
of pool sizes, we start the simulation when both pools do
not infiltrate each other, x1,2 = x2,1 = 0, and the revenue
densities are r1 = r2 = 1. At each round one pool chooses its
optimal infiltration rate based on the pool sizes and the rate
with which it is infiltrated, and we calculate the revenue after
convergence with Equation 11. Recall the players in the pool
game are chosen with the Round Robin policy, so the pools
take turns, and we let the game run until convergence. The
results are illustrated in Figure 6.
Each run with a some m1,m2 values results in a single point
in each graph in Figure 6. We depict the infiltration rates of
both pools x1,2, x2,1 in Figures 6a–6b and the pools’ revenue
densities r1, r2 in Figures 6c–6d. So for each choice of m1
and m2, the values of x1,2, x2,1, m1 and m2 are the points in
each of the graphs with the respective coordinates.
As before, for the xi,j graphs we draw a border around the
region where there is no-attack by i in equilibrium. For the ri
graphs we draw a line around the region where the revenue is
the same as in the no-attack scenario, namely 1.
We first observe that only in extreme cases a pool does not
attack its counterpart. Specifically, at equilibrium a pool will
refrain from attacking only if the other pool is larger than
about 80% of the total mining power.
But, more importantly, we observe that a pool improves its
revenue compared to the no-pool-attacks scenario only when
it controls a strict majority of the total mining power. These
are the small triangular regions in Figures 6c and 6d.
B. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
In a stable Bitcoin environment with two pools, where
neither controls a strict majority of the mining power, both
pools will earn less at equilibrium than if both pools ran
without attacking. We can analyze in this case a game where
each pool chooses either to attack, or not to attack. If it attacks,
the pool optimizes its revenue.
Consider pool 1 without loss of generality. As we have seen
in Section V, if pool 2 does not attack, pool 1 can increase its
revenue above 1 by attacking, setting x1,2 to the optimum.
If pool 2 does attack but pool 1 does not, we denote the
revenue of pool 1 by r˜1. The exact value of r˜1 depends on the
values of m1 and m2, but it is always smaller than one. As we
have seen above, if pool 1 does choose to attack, its revenue
increases, but does not surpass one. The game is summarized
in Figure 8.
When played once, this is the classical prisoner’s dilemma.
Attack is the dominant strategy: Whether pool 2 chooses to
attack or not, the revenue of pool 1 is larger when attacking
than when refraining from attack, and the same for pool 2.
At equilibrium of this attack-or-don’t game, when both pools
attack, the revenue of each pool is smaller than its revenue if
neither pool attacked.
However, the game is not played once, but rather contin-
uously, forming a super-game, where each pool can change
its strategy between attack and no-attack. If the pools agree
(even implicitly) to coordinate, in each round a pool can detect
whether it is being attacked and deduce that the other pool is
violating the agreement. In this super-game, cooperation where
neither pool attacks is a possible stable state [14], [2] despite
the fact that the single Nash equilibrium in every round is to
attack.
VII. p IDENTICAL POOLS
Let there be any number of pools of identical size that
engage in block withholding against one another. In this case
there exists a symmetric equilibrium. Consider, without loss
of generality, a step of pool 1. It controls its attack rates each
of the other pools, and due to symmetry they are all the same.
Denote by x1,¬1 the attack rate of pool 1 against any other
pool. Each of the other pools cab attack its peers as well.
Due to symmetry, all attack rates by all attackers are identical.
Denote by x¬1,∗ the attack rate of any pool other than 1 against
any other pool, including pool 1.
Denote by R1 the direct revenue (from mining) of pool 1
and by R¬1 the direct revenue of each of the other pools.
Similarly denote by r1 and r¬1 the revenue densities of pool 1
and other pools, respectively.
The generic equations 3 and 4 are instantiated to
R1 =
mi − (p− 1)x1,¬1
m− (p− 1)(p− 1)x¬1,∗ − (p− 1)x1,¬1
R¬1 =
mi − (p− 1)x¬1,∗
m− (p− 1)(p− 1)x¬1,∗ − (p− 1)x1,¬1
(17)
and
r1 =
R1 + (p− 1)x1,¬1r¬1
mi + (p− 1)x¬1,1
r¬1 =
R¬1 + (p− 2)x¬1,∗r¬1 + x¬1,∗r1
mi + (p− 2)x¬1,∗ + x1,¬1
. (18)
Substituting Equations 17 in Equation 18 and solving we
obtain a single expression for any ri, since in the symmetric
case we have r1 = r¬1. The expression is shown in Equa-
tion 18 (Figure 9).
Given any value of p and mi (where pmi < 1), the
feasible range of the infiltration rates is 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ mi/p.
Within this range ri is continuous, differentiable, and concave
in x1,¬1. Therefore, the optimal point for pool 1 is where
∂r1/∂x1,¬1 = 0. Since the function is concave the equation
yields a single feasible solution, which is a function of the
attack rates of the other pools, namely x¬1,1 and x¬1,∗.
To find a symmetric equilibrium, we equate x1,¬1 =
x¬1,1 = x¬1,∗ and obtain a single feasible solution. The
equilibrium infiltration rate and the matching revenues are
shown in Equation 20 (Figure 10).
As in the two-pool scenario, the revenue at the symmetric
equilibrium is inferior to the no-one-attacks non-equilibrium
strategy.
XXXXXXXXXXPool 2
Pool 1
no attack attack
no attack (r1 = 1, r2 = 1) (r1 > 1, r2 = r˜2 < 1)
attack (r1 = r˜1 < 1, r2 > 1) (r˜1 < r1 < 1, r˜2 < r2 < 1)
Fig. 8. Prisoner’s Dilemma for two pools. The revenue density of each pool is determined by the decision of both pools whether to attack or not. The
dominant strategy of each player is to attack, however the payoff of both would be larger if they both refrain from attacking.
ri = − m
2
i + mix1,¬1 − (p− 1)x1,¬1((p− 1)x¬1,∗ + x1,¬1)
((p− 1)x1,¬1 + (p− 1)2x¬1,∗ − 1) ((mi + x1,¬1)(mi + (p− 1)x¬1,1)− (p− 1)x1,¬1x¬1,∗) (19)
Fig. 9. Expression for ri in a system with pools of equal size.
x¯1,¬1 = x¯¬1,1 = x¯¬1,∗ =
p−mi −
√
(mi − p)2 − 4(mi)2(p− 1)2p
2(p− 1)2p)
r¯1 = r¯¬1 =
2p
p−mi + 2mip +
√
(mi − p)2 − 4(mi)2(p− 1)2p
(20)
Fig. 10. Symmetric equilibrium values for a system of p pools of equal sizes.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Bitcoin’s Health
Large pools hinder Bitcoin’s distributed nature as they put
a lot of mining power in the hands of a few pool man-
agers. This has been mostly addressed by community pressure
on miners to avoid forming large pools [1]. However such
recommendations had only had limited success, and mining
is still dominated by a small number of large pools. As a
characteristic example, in the period of November 2–8, 2014,
three pools generated over 50% of the proofs of work [20].
Long term block withholding attacks are difficult to hide,
since miners using an attacked pool would notice the re-
duced revenue density. Nevertheless, such attacks are rarely
reported3, and we can therefore conclude that they are indeed
rare. The fact that such attacks do not persist may indicate that
the active pools have reached an implicit or explicit agreement
not to attack one another.
However, an attacked pool cannot detect which of its miners
are attacking it, let alone which pool controls the miners. At
some point a pool might miscalculate and decide to try and
increase its revenue. One pool might be enough to break the
agreement, possibly leading to a constant rate of attacks among
pools and a reduced revenue.
If open pools reach a state where their revenue density is
reduced due to attacks, miners will leave them in favor of
other available options: Miners of sufficient size can mine
solo; smaller miners can form private pools with closed access,
limited to trusted participants.
Such a change in the mining forces may be in favor of
Bitcoin as a whole. Since they require such intimate trust, we
3A recent example is an attack that was partially subverted due to limited
efforts of the attacker to hide itself and an alert pool manager [29]. It is
unknown whether this was a classical block withholding attack or a more
elaborate scheme.
believe private pools are likely to be smaller, and lead to a fine
grained distribution of mining power with many small pools
and solo miners.
B. Miners and Pools
1) Direct Pool Competition: Since miners evidently prefer
to work with public pools rather than solo [20], a pool may
engage in an attack against another pool not to increase its
absolute revenue, but rather to attract miners by temporarily
increasing its revenue compared to a competing pool.
Our analysis addressed the eventual revenue of pools un-
der block withholding attacks, after the Bitcoin system has
normalized the revenues by adjusting difficulty. Before this
normalization, the revenue of an attacking pool is reduced due
to the reduction in revenue of both the attacking and attacked
pools. Nevertheless, the attacker’s revenue density compared
to the victim’s revenue density is immediately improved.
This is an an enhanced version of the classical sabotage
block withholding with a lower overhead for the attacker.
Eventually, once difficulty is adjusted, the attacker may see
an absolute benefit in attacking.
The pool game model does not cover the dynamic interplay
of pools and miners, which we leave for future work.
2) Pool Fees: We assumed in our analysis that pools do
not charge fees from their members since such fees are
typically nominal (0 – 3% of a pool’s revenue [27]). The
model can be extended to include pools fees. Fees would add
a friction element to the flow of revenue among infiltrated
and infiltrating pools. Specifically, Equation 4 would change
to take into account a pool fee of f
ri(t) =
Ri(t) +
∑p
j=1 xi,j(t)(1− f)rj(t)
mi +
∑p
j=1 xj,i(t)
. (21)
A pool with a fee of f is a less attractive target for block
withholding, since the attacker’s revenue is reduced by f .
However it is also less attractive for miners in general. Trading
off the two for best protection is left for future work, as part
of the treatment of the miner-pool interplay.
IX. RELATED WORK
A. The Block Withholding Attack
The danger of a block withholding attack is as old as Bitcoin
pools. The attack was described by Rosenfeld [22] as early
as 2011, as pools were becoming a dominant player in the
Bitcoin world. The paper described the standard attack, used
by a miner to sabotage a pool at the cost of reducing its own
revenue. Early work did not address the possibility of pools
infiltrating other pools for block withholding.
Courtois and Bahack [8] have recently noted that a pool can
increase its overall revenue with block withholding if all other
mining is performed by honest pools. We consider the general
case where not all mining is performed through public pools,
and analyze situations where pools can attack one another. The
discrepancy between the calculations of [8] and our results
for the special case analyzed there can be explained by the
strong approximations in that work. For example, we calculate
exactly how infiltrating miners reduce the revenue density of
the infiltrated pool.
B. Temporary Block Withholding
In the Block withholding attack discussed in this work the
withheld blocks are never published. However, blocks can be
withheld temporarily, not following the Bitcoin protocol, to
improve an attacker’s revenue.
An attacker can perform a double spending attack as fol-
lows [22]. He intentionally generates two conflicting trans-
actions, places one in a block it withholds, and publishes
the other transaction. After the recipient sees the published
transaction, the attacker publishes the withheld block to revoke
the former transaction. This attack is performed by miners
or pools against service providers that accept Bitcoin, and it
unrelated to this work.
A miner or a pool can perform a selfish mining attack. Here,
the attacker increases its revenue by temporarily withholding
its blocks and publishing them in response to block publication
by other pools and miners [11]. This attack is independent of
the block withholding attack we discuss here and the two can
be performed concurrently.
C. Block Withholding Defense
Most crypto-currencies use a proof-of-work architecture
similar to Bitcoin, where finding proof of work is the result
of solution guessing and checking. All of the algorithms we
are aware of are susceptible to the block withholding attack,
as in all of them the miner can check whether she found a
full solution or a partial proof of work. Prominent examples
are Litecoin [16], Dogecoin [10] and Permacoin [17].
Rosenfeld [22] suggested a change of the block structure
that would allow a pool to probe for block withholding with a
honey-pot technique. A pool could generate miner tasks that
it knows would lead to a (useless) block solution. An attacker
would withhold the solution and expose itself.
This fix, a different proof of work algorithm, or another
solution, could reduce or remove the danger of block withhold-
ing. However, this may not be in the interest of the community:
Pool block withholding, or even its potential, could lead to a
reduction of pool sizes, as explained in Section VIII-A.
D. Decentralized Pools
Although most pools use a centralized manager, a prominent
exception is P2Pool – a distributed pool architecture with no
central manager [13]. But the question of whether a pool is run
by a centralized manager or with a decentralized architecture is
almost immaterial for the attack we describe. An open P2Pool
group can be infiltrated and attacked, and the P2Pool code can
be changed to support attacks against other pools.
On the other hand, P2Pool can be used by groups of miners
to easily form closed pools. These do not accept untrusted
miners, and are therefore protected against block withholding.
X. CONCLUSION
We explored a block withholding attack among Bitcoin
mining pools — an attack that is possible in any similar
system that rewards for proof of work. Such systems are
gaining popularity, running most digital currencies and related
services.
We observe that no-pool-attacks is not a Nash equilibrium:
If none of the other pools attack, a pool can increase its
revenue by attacking the others.
When two pools can attack each other, they face a version
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. If one pool chooses to attack, the
victim’s revenue is reduced, and it can retaliate by attacking
and increase its revenue. However, when both attack, at Nash
equilibrium both earn less than they would have if neither
attacked. With multiple pools of equal size a similar situation
arises with a symmetric equilibrium.
The fact that block withholding is not common may be
explained by modeling the attack decisions as an iterative
prisoner’s dilemma. However, we argue that since the attack
can be done anonymously by any of the pools, this situation
is unstable. Eventually one pool may decide to increase its
revenue and drag the others to attack as well, ending with
a reduced revenue for all. This would push miners to join
private pools which can verify that their registered miners do
not withhold blocks. This may lead to smaller pools, and so
ultimately to a better environment for Bitcoin as a whole.
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